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H I G H L I G H T S
• We study the impact of batteries on electricity supply and renewable energy expansion.
• We simulate optimal capacity of batteries depending on excess electricity demand.
• We develop policy scenarios in which batteries are subsidized by the government.
• We show that electricity market conditions require governmental intervention.
• We show that government subsidies for batteries can be economically feasible.






A B S T R A C T
Increasing amounts of fluctuating renewable energy lead to decreasing electricity prices and impair security of
electricity supply. Consequently, sustainable and economically feasible solutions need to be found to ensure both
ongoing renewable energy expansion and stable electricity supply. We examine the impact of batteries on se-
curity of the electricity supply and achieving renewable energy expansion. For this purpose we develop an
electricity market model that enables the simulation of batteries both as an economic-driven investment option
and as a government subsidized option. We present six policy scenarios in which batteries are utilized as an
option that is subsidized by the government to secure electricity supply and engender renewable energy ex-
pansion. Our simulations, based on empirical data, indicate that, in a free market, battery investments are not
profitable for private investors. On the other hand, these six policy scenarios show that by subsidizing invest-
ments in batteries governments could ensure a secure electricity supply as well as ongoing renewable energy
expansion. A comparison to similar policy scenarios that do not adopt batteries indicates that the total sum of
government subsidies and external costs is up to 36% lower when utilizing batteries.
1. Introduction
As a result of technological developments, onshore wind energy has
become cost competitive with conventional power plants. At the same
time, the lower marginal costs of renewable energy (RE) has led to a
significant decrease in the price of electricity on the free market. This
impacts substantially upon the profitability of both RE and conven-
tional power plants. Recent research (see [1] showed that many power
plants must be decommissioned for economic reasons, resulting in in-
sufficient generation capacity within the market to meet peak
electricity demand. This imbalance has initiated further research on the
range of market instruments that are designed to secure the electricity
supply and RE expansion. Key factors commonly cited in extant lit-
erature include changes in market design, adaptation of the electricity
grid, consistent demand-side management, as well as both short-term
and long-term storage [2–7]. Sustainable storage technologies have
received increased interest as an economically profitable and en-
vironmentally friendly option through which to achieve the objective of
a green energy supply [8]. In this regard, especial focus has been paid to
utilizing batteries as a safe and stable energy storage system with
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sharply decreasing costs [9,10].
This paper explores the impact of large-scale battery systems on the
security of the electricity supply and RE expansion. We develop an
electricity market model that enables the simulation of batteries as a
dynamic, economic-driven investment option. Moreover, we delineate
six policy scenarios that utilize batteries as a government subsidized
option for securing electricity supply and RE expansion. For each sce-
nario, we simulate, using empirical data from the German electricity
market, the amount of RE produced, the charging and discharging vo-
lume of batteries (battery energy), total CO2 emissions, as well as the
subsidies and external costs required to ensure security of supply.
We focus on Germany, being among the leading countries in the
transition towards renewable electricity supply systems. With its strong
expansion of RE and its decision to phase-out both nuclear and coal
power plants, Germany is faced with the major challenge of increas-
ingly fluctuating RE leading to decreasing electricity prices and im-
pairing security of electricity supply. As a consequence, Germany has to
find sustainable and economically feasible solutions in the short-term
on how to realize ongoing RE growth as well as security of electricity
supply.
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first paper that develops a
theoretical framework incorporating long-term interaction amongst
multiple energy and energy storage systems (renewable/conventional
energy, battery storage) and accordingly simulating optimal capacity of
batteries depending on excess electricity demand. We contribute to the
academic literature by developing policy scenarios that utilize batteries
and aim to achieve both RE expansion and security of electricity supply.
Our scenarios are based on alternative assumptions on market condi-
tions (free market versus subsidized production) for batteries, both for
the conventional and the RE energy sector. Our research expands extant
literature by comparing the potential costs incurred by subsidizing
batteries to policy scenarios not relying on battery use. This paper
contributes to the field by producing new insights into the impact of
batteries on the future development of RE and the capacity of con-
ventional power plants. Accordingly, our research assists the decision-
making process of policy makers by providing a new understanding of
future electricity generation and its attendant subsidies and external
costs. In Section 2, we review the existing literature on the impact of
batteries on the development of RE and conventional power plant ca-
pacity. The methodological approach that underpins our analysis is
outlined in Section 3. Section 4 presents the results of our simulation,
while Section 5 provides concluding remarks.
2. Review of the literature
Several papers model energy storage systems; Zerrahn and Schill
[11] provide a comprehensive overview of different approaches in the
literature. Hemmati et al. [12] showed that energy storage facilities
may lead to a replacement of peak-load fossil-fuel power plants. Ac-
cording to Bento et al. [13] and Zhao et al. [14] the integration of
storage facilities can partly compensate for fluctuations of RE with the
result that the overall electricity generation becomes more stable and
cost-effective. Similar to this finding, Gaete-Morales et al. [15] came to
the conclusion that long-term energy storage helps to achieve low
electricity costs. Narayanan et al. [16] investigated the feasibility of a
100% RE supply for cities and concluded that storage facilities are
crucial for that purpose. Zerrahn et al. [17] showed that electrical
storage needs can be reduced if the electricity sector is broadened by
including flexible additional demand, e. g. related to heating or mobi-
lity.
Timilsina et al. [18] explored the efficiency of photovoltaic power
plants during periods of low radiation. They concluded that batteries
were indispensable to bridge gaps in the RE supply. In Bangladesh, a
power system comprising wind and photovoltaic power plants in
combination with batteries has also proven to be an economically
profitable and environmentally friendly alternative. The system can
supply electricity to an entire remote community at a low cost, whilst,
simultaneously, reducing CO2 emissions and rendering grid expansion
unnecessary [19]. Afanasyeva et al. [20] calculated the economic
competitiveness of a Moroccan hybrid power plant consisting of a
photovoltaic installation, a gas turbine and batteries. They found that
there was a tenfold reduction in CO2 emissions in the hybrid power
plant compared to a conventional power plant. Although, based on
present fuel costs, the total production costs of the hybrid power plant
are 20% higher, due to the utilization of RE and batteries, the hybrid
power plant is considerably less vulnerable to any potential increase in
fossil resource prices.
A specific option for balancing the differences between electricity
supply and demand is using electric vehicles to serve as mobile battery
carriers [21]. Kempton and Kubo [22] observed that electric and hybrid
vehicles were frequently on stand-by during peak load hours. Instead,
their battery capacity could be utilized to bridge the demand peaks in
urban metropolitan areas [21]. This would result in a reduction of the
necessary peak load capacity, enhance the cost-efficiency of private
electric car ownership and reduce CO2 emissions [23].
More specifically for Germany, Babrowski et al. [24] integrated
battery storage facilities into an optimization model in order to de-
termine the optimal amount of storage capacity up to 2040. They found
that it is beneficial to commission about 3.2 GW of batteries until 2040
(provided that investment costs of batteries are at a level of 150
€/kWh). Sinn [25] also simulates the electricity storage requirements
for Germany. He concludes that in order to achieve a combined share of
wind and solar of 89%, electricity storage capacity in excess of 16,300
GWh is necessary. In contrast to this, Schill and Zerrahn [26] found that
for a share of RE of 88% in electricity generation, a minimum of 436
GWh of storage would be required in Germany (different to Sinn [25],
Schill and Zerrahn [26] combine RE expansion, RE curtailment and
electrical storage). Similarly, Pape [27] found that for Germany as well
as for Europe as a whole hardly any investments in electricity storage
are needed in the short- to medium-term.
Nieto et al. [28] came to the conclusion that battery electricity
storage media are essential for stabilizing electric grids and ensuring
the security of the electricity supply against the backdrop of RE ex-
pansion. However, they also stressed that batteries are simply not
economically viable without support from subsidies. Based on a model-
based calculation, Locatelli et al. [29] also found that British energy
storage plants would not be profitable without subsidies.
In summary, the application of batteries has been shown to have a
positive impact on securing the energy supply by balancing the fluc-
tuating supply of RE. Furthermore, batteries can reduce the amount of
energy required from fossil fuel power plants that would otherwise be
necessary to supplement RE and meet peak load. Consequently, bat-
teries can reduce CO2 emissions. However, the current costs of batteries
are not competitive with conventional generation technologies, and,
thus, free market-based investments in batteries are likely to be the
exception rather than the rule in the short to medium-term.
Our analysis contributes to this earlier literature by explicitly fo-
cusing on the role of government subsidized batteries in the German
electricity market. Different to the existing papers, we develop six
policy scenarios that simulate government subsidized optimal capacity
of batteries depending on excess electricity demand.
3. Methodological approach
In this section we present the methodological approach under-
pinning our study. In Section 3.1 we explain the Load Duration Curve
Model, which forms the basis of our electricity market model. Next, we
proceed to present our approach to integrating batteries into the elec-
tricity market model, first, as a free market investment (see Section
3.2.1) and, subsequently, as a subsidized investment (see Section 3.2.2).
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3.1. Load Duration curve model
In this subsection we delineate the electricity market model that
serves as the basis for our integration of batteries (see Section 3.2) and
simulation of policy scenarios (see Section 4). The market model,
commonly referred to as the Load Duration Curve model (LDCM) in
extant literature [30–32] is based on the Load Duration Curve (LDC)
and the Merit Order Curve (MO). The LDC shows the electricity demand
in MW per hour for a given year, presented in descending order of
magnitude. In the MO, the electricity supply of both RE (in the case of
RE traded on the free market) and conventional power plants is ranked
in ascending order of marginal costs. Linking the LDC and MO in this
way allows each hourly electricity demand to be assigned to the cor-
responding electricity price. Based on this, the so-called Price Duration
Curve (PDC) can be identified, which allocates the price of the de-
manded quantities of electricity to the corresponding duration in hours.
The PDC allows for the calculation of the contribution margins of each
power plant, so that net present values (NPV) can also be determined
(see [1]).
In order to explore the profitability of both conventional and RE
power plants, the NPV for each year was calculated over a ten-year
period. Free market-based investments in power plants are executed
with an optimization model that identifies the type of power plant in-
vestment (e.g. wind or gas) that maximizes the NPV, as well as the
optimal capacity in MW. Furthermore, it is assumed that power plants
are removed from the market once they reach the end of their technical
lifecycle. In those policy scenarios (see Section 4.2) where power plants
are decommissioned due to economic inefficiency, the underlying as-
sumption is that there is a negative NPV for five successive years. In the
case of closures and new investments in power plants, it is assumed that
these materialise in the following year. For more details on the LDCM,
see Coester et al. [1].
3.2. Integration of batteries in the model
We used the LDCM as a basis and extended it to integrate the special
characteristics of batteries. In Section 3.2.1 we develop a model where
batteries are treated as a free market investment, while Section 3.2.2
develops a model where batteries are applied as a government sub-
sidized investment.
3.2.1. Batteries as a free market investment
Fig. 1 presents in schematic form the impact of batteries on elec-
tricity demand, based on empirical data from the German electricity
market (for more information concerning the data see Section 4.1). The
black curve depicts a typical level of electricity demand over the course
of a 24-hour period with no batteries in the market. The blue curve
presents the corresponding price per hour of electricity. The dotted
black segments of the curve indicate the adjusted electricity demand
subsequent to the investment in batteries with a capacity of Δ. In a free
market, battery capacity will be charged at the lowest possible cost,
thus, at the lowest level of electricity demand and the (corresponding)
lowest price of electricity. Resultantly, electricity demand increases by
Δ during the period of charging the batteries. The increase in demand in
turn leads to a corresponding rise in the price of electricity (see the blue
dotted segments of the curve). The opposite effect occurs during the
discharging of batteries. In order to maximize profitability within a free
market, batteries will be discharged during peak demand hours that
have the highest level of electricity prices. In so doing, electricity de-
mand decreases by Δ and electricity prices fall accordingly. As a con-
sequence of increased investments in batteries, the demand curve flat-
tens. This reduces the gap between low and high electricity prices,
which corresponds to the contribution margins of batteries.
In a free market, the profit maximizing investment in batteries in
year t (Bt) can be determined by maximizing the net present value
(NPVBt):



















where t refers to the year of production (t = 2017, … 2036; we chose
2017 as the starting point for our simulations as data was fully available
from that year onwards, see also Section 4.1), CMBi is the contribution
margin of Bt in year i, FCBi are the annualized fixed costs of Bt in year i
and dr represents the discount rate.
While the entire period of investigation is 20 years, the NPV max-
imization modelling for each year considers only a ten year period, due
to the fact that market development is too uncertain over a longer
period of time. In order to account for the aforementioned inter-
dependency between battery investments and the resulting effects on
the demand curve and electricity prices, respectively, it is critically
important to link the NPV maximization modeling of Bt to the demand
curve. In so doing, the impact of the flattening effect of increasing
battery capacity on the demand curve can be reflected in CMBi.
We assume that charging batteries takes the same time as dischar-
ging. Moreover, we assume that batteries cannot be charged and dis-
charged during the same hour and must be charged and discharged over
the course of 24 h. To achieve a positive contribution margin, the
electricity price during the discharging of batteries must be higher than
the price when charging the batteries. We model twelve possible
combinations of charging and discharging hours per day. The couple of
hours that yield the highest contribution margin reflects the discharging
of batteries during the peak price of electricity and the charging of
batteries during the minimum price of electricity. Conversely, the
couple of hours that yield the lowest contribution margin in turn as-
sumes a period of discharging at the twelfth highest electricity price
and a period of charging at the twelfth lowest price (thus, no couple of
hours results in negative contribution margins). At this point, the
contribution margin for one day is equal to the sum of the contribution
margins associated with the twelve couples of hours. Accordingly, the
contribution margin for the full year, for a given investment in battery
capacity, is equal to the sum of the daily contribution margins for that
invested capacity. The optimal investment capacity in batteries in year t
is then given by the battery capacity Bt generating yearly contribution
margins (in combination with yearly annualized fixed costs) that
maximize NPV. For each subsequent year, the demand curves must then
be amended according to the battery investments that came into the
market, i.e. an increase in demand during the charging of batteries and
a decrease in demand during periods when batteries are being dis-
charged. In those cases when a battery investment has a negative NPV
five years in a row, it is assumed that these batteries are deinstalled and,
subsequently, they are taken out of the market in the sixth year.
3.2.2. Batteries as a subsidized investment
In the policy scenarios developed in Section 4.2, batteries are uti-
lized as a government subsidized investment in order to secure the
electricity supply and support RE expansion. Against this backdrop, the
optimal capacity of battery investment B( )topt is no longer determined by
maximizing NPV. As Fig. 2 illustrates, Btopt now refers to the difference
between the electricity demand curve D and the maximum of electricity
supply S for those hours where there is excess demand ED. As a next
step, the existing excess supply capacity ES of power plants in the
market must be defined. ES is given by the difference between S and D
for those hours where there is excess supply. If >B EStopt then a sup-
plementary investment in power plants (the type of power plant varies
depending on the particular policy scenario, see Section 4.2.) is ne-
cessary in order to have sufficient generation capacity for the charging
of batteries. The capacity of the supplementary power plant investment
is thus given by the difference between B and EStopt .
The necessary battery and supplementary power plant capacities are
then integrated into the market model in the same way as under free
market conditions (see Section 3.2.1). In the case that the NPV of bat-
teries is negative for five years in a row, then further losses beginning in
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the sixth year are subsidized by the government, so that these invest-
ments can remain in the market.
4. Simulations
This section presents our simulations. After a description of the
empirical data in Section 4.1, we describe the six policy scenarios we
developed and outline the main simulation results for each scenario
(see Section 4.2). In Section 4.3, we analyze further the results of our
simulations before proceeding to show the findings of our sensitivity
analysis.
4.1. Data
In this subsection we present the empirical data that we utilize in
our simulations. We investigate a 20-year period beginning in 2017. We
assume that there is no transnational trade in electricity and that con-
ventional electricity is fully traded on the spot market. Peak load prices
are assumed to be equivalent to those prices on the spot market, with a
mark-up of 5%. We regard this assumption to be valid as the size of the
mark-up depends on the ratio of available generation capacity and
demand [33]. Furthermore, we assume a discount rate of 7.14% [34].
With regards to the supply side, economic and technical data on actual
Fig. 1. Schematic impact of batteries on the demand curve.
Fig. 2. Schematic depiction of battery capacity under subsidized market conditions.
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conventional power plants operating within the German electricity
market are based on information from the Federal Network Agency
[35] and Western German state Bank [36]. The Agency for Renewable
Energies [37], the Institute of Energy Economics (EWI), the Institute of
Economic Structures Research (GWS) and Prognos [38] provide the
basis for the future development of the main parameters of our simu-
lations. In order to account for the potential unavailability of plants or
start-up and shut-down times, we assume a reduction in the installed
capacity of each power plant by 10% [34,39]. Our RE dataset is based
on information from the Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and
Energy [40], Kaltschmitt et al. [41] and Deutsche Windguard GmbH
[42]. We calculated the availability factors of photovoltaic and wind
energy through conducting a time series analysis based on data from
EEX [43]. For biomass, geothermal and hydro energy, we utilized
customary availability factors based on Möst et al. [44]. With respect to
the demand side, our data set is based on historical real data of the
hourly electricity demand in Germany [45]. In our reference projection,
we assume that this demand is constant for the period under in-
vestigation up until 2036. We account for possible changes in the future
development of demand by conducting a sensitivity analysis
(± 0.50%/year; see Section 4.3.7). Economic and technical data on
batteries comes from Zapf [46], Mahnke et al. [47], Pape [27] and
Sterner and Stadler [48]. We assume investment costs of M€ 0.36 per
MW in 2017 and further annual costs of 2% of total investment costs. In
addition to this, we assume a linear decrease in investment costs to M€
0.22 per MW in 2030. For the remaining years, 2031 to 2036, we as-
sume a further linear decrease in annualized costs. The sensitivity
analysis (see Section 4.3.7) considers the effects of annualized costs of
batteries that are 10% below our reference projection. The external
costs of electricity generation are also considered. These costs refer to
the environmental and health damages associated with the respective
electricity generation technology, which are borne by third parties. We
calculate the average external costs per MWh based on data from
Krewitt and Schlomann [49], Hohmeyer [50] Enquete-Kommission
[51], Enquete-Kommission [52], Friedrich [53] and Braun [54]. Table 1
provides an overview of the external costs that we assumed for our
simulations.
4.2. Description and simulation results of reference scenario and policy
scenarios
For our simulation, we developed a reference scenario along with
six policy scenarios. The reference scenario serves as a benchmark,
reflecting the situation under free market conditions. The policy sce-
narios are composed of several policy measures, many of them based on
measures, such as Fixed Feed-in tariff (FIT) mechanisms for RE and
subsidies for batteries, that have already been adopted in practice in
Germany as well as several other countries. Moreover, we employ a
newly developed market design, the RE adaptation market design for
conventional power plants [1]. All six policy scenarios were developed
with the objective of simultaneously guaranteeing security of electricity
supply and ongoing RE expansion. Each policy scenario comes into
operation as soon as total electricity supply falls below the level of
demand in the reference scenario.
In practise, policy makers typically focus on subsidizing investments
in batteries production plants. As our policy scenarios aim at securing
electricity supply, we included policy measures targeted at subsidizing
ongoing operation of batteries production plants. We assumed in our
scenarios that the subsidization of batteries becomes effective in
instances in which their NPV is negative for five successive years.
Starting from the sixth year onwards, governments compensate for any
additional negative NPVs. Along the same lines we assume in our sce-
narios that government subsidies pay for necessary supplement power
plants (the actual type of supplement power plant is dependent on the
assumptions of the specific policy scenario). Finally, we assume that
government subsidies pay for RE FITs.
4.2.1. Reference scenario
4.2.1.1. Description. The reference scenario refers to a free market
environment. We assume that investments in RE, conventional power
plants and batteries are made by private investors.
4.2.1.2. Simulation results. In the reference scenario, the low marginal
costs of RE production generate high contribution margins, as
electricity prices are (initially) set by conventional power plants
operating with high marginal costs. This leads to strong investments
in RE, particularly wind energy, which, in turn, results in the highest RE
production of all the scenarios. However, the high level of RE
production with marginal costs close to zero leads to a corresponding
decrease in the price of electricity. Consequently, both conventional
and RE power plants are decommissioned after five years of
unprofitable operation, which results in the security of electricity
supply not being guaranteed in this scenario.
4.2.2. Standard policy scenario - batteries subsidized
4.2.2.1. Description. This first scenario is classified as “standard”,
because conventional electricity is traded on the basis of a common
electricity market design. In case of insufficient electricity supply, RE is
taken out of the free market in this scenario and is instead subject to a
FIT mechanism for the rest of the period under consideration. The FIT
mechanism applied is the classical FIT mechanism that was applied for
several years in Germany in an attempt to engender an RE expansion.
The average annual tariffs for each RE technology are extrapolated until
the end of the period under consideration [55]. Furthermore, we
assume that conventional power plants remain in the free market and
are shut down either due to economic inefficiency, or because they
reach the end of their economic lifecycle. Existing undercapacities in
the market are topped up with an optimal mix of batteries and efficient
gas power plants. For these complementary investments, the costs of
negative NPVs are subsidized, beginning from the sixth year onwards.
4.2.2.2. Simulation results. The standard policy scenario results in the
lowest subsidies being paid by the government in order to guarantee
security of supply and RE expansion. This is because RE is subject to a
FIT mechanism in this scenario. As a result of this, RE production
develops slower but more steadily, so that electricity prices remain at a
higher level and the remaining power plants are capable of operating
without subsidies. However, for the same reason, the standard policy
scenario also produces the highest CO2 emissions of all scenarios.
4.2.3. Free market green policy scenario – Batteries subsidized
4.2.3.1. Description. In this scenario, both conventional power plants
and batteries are treated in the same way as in the standard policy
scenario. In contrast to the standard policy scenario, RE remains in the
free market. As a consequence of this, RE power plants are not
subsidized through a FIT mechanism but are decommissioned in the
event that their NPV is negative five years in a row.
Table 1
Assumed External Costs in € Cent per MWh.
Lignite Hard Coal Oil Gas Nuclear Hydropower Geothermal Biomass Wind Photovoltaics
11.07 8.97 14.54 4.79 54.73 0.32 0.80 1.32 0.13 0.86
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4.2.3.2. Simulation results. The ‘free market green policy scenario’
produces the lowest sum of subsidies and external costs of all the
policy scenarios. The principal reason for this is that RE remains in the
free market in this scenario, so that no subsidies are required for RE
production and low external costs arise. However, the free market
conditions also lead to extremely cyclical RE production; i.e. after five
years of very high RE production, power plants are decommissioned
due to unprofitable operating. Our assumption in this scenario is that a
mixture of batteries and gas power plants then must be installed to
secure the electricity supply. The high marginal costs of these gas power
plants, once again, leads to a high level of investment in RE, so that the
same cycle with five years of high RE production begins again.
4.2.4. Green support policy scenario - batteries subsidized
4.2.4.1. Description. The key feature of the green support policy
scenario is that shortages in supply are topped up with an optimal
mixture of batteries and green power plants. These supplementary
green power plants comprise a combination of onshore and offshore
wind energy, photovoltaic, hydro, geothermal and biomass power
plants. This combination is based on the distribution of RE power
plant technologies as per the expansion goals of the German Federal
Government [56]. The supplementary RE power plants together with
batteries receive subsidies, which, in turn, allow them to remain in the
market even when running at an economic loss. Further assumptions
pertaining to the remaining RE and conventional power plants are
similar to those in the free market green policy scenario.
4.2.4.2. Simulation results. This scenario results in the highest RE
production and the lowest level of CO2 emissions of all scenarios that
guarantee security of electricity supply. However, it also leads to the
highest amount of government subsidies by far. This is because all
investments in this scenario that are necessary for securing electricity
supply are made in a mixture of green power plants. Consequently, all
conventional power plants are driven out of the market, and the price of
electricity becomes close to zero. This, in turn, prevents additional free
market investments in RE, and thus substantial government subsidies
are required to maintain security of supply.
4.2.5. Green FIT policy scenario - batteries subsidized
4.2.5.1. Description. The Green FIT policy scenario differs from the
previous one due to the way RE is treated. In the Green support policy
scenario, both RE generally and the supplementary green power plants
were traded under free market conditions. In contradistinction to this,
in the Green FIT policy scenario all types of RE are subsidized through a
FIT mechanism in case of insufficient electricity supply. The difference
between this and the standard policy is that here shortages in electricity
supply are topped up with an optimal mixture of batteries and green
power plants, whereas, in the standard policy scenario, supply gaps
were resolved by an optimal mixture of batteries and gas power plants.
4.2.5.2. Simulation results. This scenario corresponds to the second
lowest level of subsidies and external costs. Given that a FIT
mechanism is applied in this scenario, the RE expansion is slower,
but more constant. This means that the electricity price remains at such
a level that conventional power plants can remain in the market and
help to secure the electricity supply without the need for high subsidies.
Due to the fact that additional investments necessary for meeting
electricity demand are made in a mixture of green power plants, this
scenario also guarantees the constant expansion of RE. The combination
of retaining electricity prices at a relatively high level, so that
conventional power plants can operate until they reach the end of
their lifecycle, allied with RE constantly expanding without the need for
high subsidies renders this energy policy appealing to policymakers.
4.2.6. Regulated RE adaptation policy scenario - batteries subsidized
4.2.6.1. Description. In this policy scenario, the RE adaptation market
design, which is a new market design for conventional power plants, is
applied. This new market design is based on the work of Coester et al.
[1], who developed a market design with the objective of guaranteeing
security of electricity supply and fostering RE expansion. The principal
assumption of this novel market design is that electricity prices and the
profitability of conventional power plants are significantly dependent
on the ability of the complex of conventional power plants to optimally
react to changes in residual load, i.e. electricity demand minus RE
supply. In theory, it is possible to simulate a complex of conventional
power plants that can optimally adapt to residual load. To achieve this,
the total annual cost per MW for each conventional power plant must
be calculated as a function of their periods of use. On that basis, the
most cost-effective complex of conventional power plants can be
selected for each quantity of residual load for each of the 8760 h per
year. This selection of conventional power plants results in an efficiency
cost curve. Based on the optimal order and quantities of conventional
power plants as per the efficiency cost curve, the actual power plants
that exist in the market are able to offer electricity capacities. The
profitability of power plants is then once again modelled through the
application of the LDCM with the same underlying assumptions (see
Section 3.1). In the event of shortages in the electricity supply, we
assume in this novel market design that subsidized investment in an
optimal mixture of batteries and conventional power plants is carried
out. The type of supplementary conventional power plant corresponds
to the optimal adapted power plant as per the efficiency cost curve.
Furthermore, in this policy scenario, we assume that RE is taken out of
the free market and subsequently subjected to a FIT mechanism.
4.2.6.2. Simulation results. The analysis conducted by Coester et al. [1]
showed that, in theory at least, such an optimal adapted complex of
conventional power plants invariably leads to the highest possible
average electricity price and the most cost-efficient supply of
electricity. However, their analysis also reveals that the mere
orientation of existing power plants to an optimally adapted solution
is in itself not sufficient for achieving an improved market environment
and ensuring an uninterrupted power supply in the real world. The
main reason for this is that, in theory, the optimal complex of
conventional power plants can dynamically change depending on
changes in the demand for electricity and the production volumes of
RE. However, the requirement for dynamic changes in the complex of
conventional power plants cannot be met in reality, as the lifecycle of
power plants typically amounts to 40 to 50 years.
The application of this new market design as a policy scenario along
with batteries also indicates that it is not a cost competitive option for
guaranteeing the security of the electricity supply and achieving RE
expansion. Most notably, the external costs were the highest of all the
policy scenarios. This is because of the application of nuclear power
plants with extremely high external costs.
4.2.7. Free market RE adaptation policy scenario - batteries subsidized
4.2.7.1. Description. In the Free market RE adaptation policy scenario,
we generally apply the same approach as in the previous scenario.
When electricity supply falls below the demand level, then subsidized
investments in an optimal mixture of batteries and conventional power
plants are made. The only difference concerns the way that RE is
treated. In this scenario, RE entirely competes in the free market.
4.2.7.2. Simulation results. This policy scenario also necessitates high
external costs, as nuclear energy will not be phased out. Given that RE
remains in the free market in this scenario, there are large investments
in RE. For this reason, the price of electricity significantly decreases and
a significant amount of power plants have to be decommissioned as a
result. The new electricity market design is capable of substituting for
the reduced electricity supply and, thus, the security of the electricity
supply can also be guaranteed in this policy scenario.
A. Coester, et al. Applied Energy 275 (2020) 115364
6
4.3. Discussion of results
In this subsection, we further analyze the results of our simulations
concerning the security of the electricity supply, RE produced, elec-
tricity supply from batteries, CO2 emissions, subsidies and external
costs (Sections 4.3.1-4.3.5; Figs. 3–6). For an overview of the devel-
opment of installed capacity for conventional power plants, RE and
batteries over time under the different scenarios the reader is referred
to Figs. A1–A7 in the appendix. Section 4.3.6 compares the results with
similar policy scenarios without batteries as per the discussion in
Coester et al. [2]. Table 2 provides an overview of the results of all
scenarios, both with and without batteries. Finally, Section 4.3.7 ana-
lyses the sensitivity of results with regards to changes in electricity
demand and the costs of batteries.
4.3.1. Security of electricity supply
The simulation results show that, under completely free market
conditions in the reference policy scenario, electricity supply falls
below demand, which means that there is no security of electricity
supply. This is because of large investments in RE power plants, par-
ticularly wind energy. Their low marginal costs lead to a significant
reduction in the price of electricity, with the consequence being that
both conventional and RE power, as well as batteries, are not able to
operate profitably. With regards to the six policy scenarios outlined
here, all policy scenarios are capable of guaranteeing the security of the
electricity supply. In Figs. 3–6 below the reference scenario, which is
incapable of securing the electricity supply, is depicted with dashed
bars. Note that Figs. 3, 5 and 6 also include results for scenarios without
batteries which will be discussed in Section 4.3.7.
4.3.2. Renewable energy produced
Fig. 3 depicts that most RE is produced in those scenarios (with
batteries) where RE is traded on the free market. The three scenarios in
which RE operates in the free market result in a total RE production of
more than 9 million GWh over the 20 years simulation period.
However, it is important to mention here that the development of
RE power plant capacity in these scenarios is extremely cyclical. Under
free market conditions, electricity prices are (initially) set by
Fig. 3. RE produced (cumulative over the simulation period) [The scenarios without batteries are based on Coester et al. [2]].
Fig. 4. Electricity supply from batteries (cumulative over the simulation period).
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conventional power plants operating with high marginal costs, resulting
in huge investments in RE. Following this, the low marginal cost RE
production pushes conventional power plants out of the market and
results in an electricity price close to zero. In response to this, both RE
and conventional power plants are decommissioned after five con-
secutive years of unprofitable operation. This results in a shortage of
energy supply, which, in turn, leads to subsidized investments in an
optimal mixture of batteries and efficient gas power plants (‘Free
market green – batteries subsidized’), subsidized investments in a
mixture of batteries and green power plants(‘Green support – batteries
subsidized’) and subsidized investment in a mixture of batteries and
conventional power plants (‘Free market RE adaptation – batteries
subsidized’). These subsidized batteries and power plants trigger new,
substantial investments in RE power plants so that the same cycle of
investment and subsequent disinvestment begins all over again.
In comparison to RE on the free market, those policy scenarios that
apply a FIT mechanism lead to a lower RE production of around 5
million GWh. On the other hand, RE expansion in these scenarios is
altogether more stable, with the consequence being that prices and the
profitability of RE and conventional power plants are less affected than
in the free market scenario.
4.3.3. Electricity supply from batteries
In the reference policy scenario, batteries are assumed to be a dy-
namic investment option in a free electricity market model. As Fig. 4
shows, this assumption results in no battery investment. Even though
Fig. 5. CO2 emissions (cumulative over the simulation period) [The scenarios without batteries are based on Coester et al. [2]].
Fig. 6. Subsidies and external costs (cumulative over the simulation period) [The scenarios without batteries are based on Coester et al. [2]].
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the investment costs in batteries are assumed to decrease over the
period under consideration, they are still too high to engender profit-
able investments. On those days in which the spread between the
maximum and the minimum electricity price is high, the contribution
margins are sufficient to compensate for high (daily) battery costs.
However, the overall NPV maximization modelling over the entire year
results in no battery investment. Within those policy scenarios where
battery investments are applied as government subsidies to guarantee
the security of supply and achieve RE expansion, the cumulative elec-
tricity supply from batteries varies between 59,712 GWh and 110,839
GWh. In those scenarios where RE is traded on the free market, the
large RE investments result in a relatively small electricity supply gap.
Consequently, the optimal amount of electricity supply from batteries is
lower at 59,712 GWh. When RE is assumed to be supported by a FIT
mechanism, the slower but more constant development of RE requires
nearly twice the electricity supply from government subsidized bat-
teries.
4.3.4. CO2 emissions
With regards to CO2 emissions, Fig. 5 illustrates that the policy
scenarios (with batteries) in which RE is traded on the free market
culminate in the lowest amount of total emissions over the period of
investigation of 20 years. In particular, the ‘Green support policy sce-
nario’ leads to the lowest CO2 emissions of all the policy scenarios with
only 1343 megatons. On the one hand, this is because RE is traded on
the free market in this scenario, which results in high RE investments
(see Fig. 3). In addition to this, the subsidized investments in batteries
are supplemented by an optimal mixture of RE power plants in this
scenario. This further reduces the amount of emissions compared to
supplementation via gas power plants that occurred in the ‘Free market
green policy scenario’, corresponding to the second lowest total emis-
sions of around 1900 megatons.
Policy scenarios in which RE are subject to a FIT mechanism result
in higher CO2 emissions of around 4000 megatons. As noted in the
previous subsections, this is because RE expands more slowly under
FITs, with the effect being that more CO2 emitting conventional power
plants operate in the market.
4.3.5. Subsidies and external costs
Fig. 6 shows that the ‘green support policy scenario’ (with batteries)
requires the highest amount of government subsidies by far at € 379
billion. As aforesaid, in this scenario RE is traded on the free market,
while all necessary investments for guaranteeing the security of the
supply are made via an optimal mixture of batteries and green power
plants. For this reason, all conventional power plants are driven out of
the market, which results in an electricity price close to zero and,
hence, extremely high subsidies. At the same time, due to the high level
of RE production this scenario produces the lowest external costs.
However, the total sum of the subsidies and external costs associated
with the ‘green support policy scenario’ significantly exceeds those of
the remaining policy scenarios (with batteries). The policy scenario that
requires the lowest government subsidies is the ‘standard policy sce-
nario’, totaling around € 2.3 billion. These subsidies account for the FIT
mechanism that is applied in this scenario. Because this mechanism
leads to a slower expansion of RE compared to free market conditions,
the electricity prices in the market are at a higher level, which means
that no further subsidies for batteries or supplementary gas power
plants are required.
The ‘green FIT policy scenario’ only slightly results in higher sub-
sidies (€ 2.6 billion), but corresponds to lower external costs (as ne-
cessary supplementations to battery investments are not made in effi-
cient gas power plants, but rather in a mixture of RE power plants).
Overall, the total sum of subsidies and external costs amounts to ap-
proximately € 65 billion. The ‘free market green policy scenario’ cor-
responds to the lowest sum of subsidies and externalities, totaling
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subsidies are higher, but external costs are considerably lower due to
the higher amount of RE produced.
The ‘regulated RE adaptation battery scenario’ is not a cost-com-
petitive option. In addition to the subsidies that are necessary for RE in
the FIT mechanism, the newly developed market design does not allow
for a profitable operation of batteries, which means that further sub-
sidies must be spent. External costs in this scenario are the highest of all
policy scenarios at € 83.4 billion. This is primarily because nuclear
power plants, which have the highest external costs per MWh produced
of all power plants, are not phased-out and remain in operation. In
comparison, the ‘free market RE adaptation scenario’ results in slightly
lower total costs, since RE remains on the free market which leads to
lower external costs.
In summary, higher amounts of RE production, in the policy sce-
narios where RE is traded on the free market, lead to market conditions
that require subsidies for both batteries and the respective supple-
mentary investments. On the other hand, high RE production volumes
result in considerably lower external costs across these specific policy
scenarios. However, as aforesaid in Section 4.3.1, RE production can be
profoundly cyclical (and, hence, of less appeal to policymakers). In
contrast, the ‘green FIT policy scenario’ (which has the second lowest
level of subsidies and external costs) displays a more stable expansion
of RE and leads to lower subsidies. Conventional power plants can be
successively phased-out in this scenario, i.e. decommissioned when
they reach the end of their economic lifecycle.
4.3.6. Summary and comparison with policy scenarios that do not apply
batteries
Table 2 gives an overview of our simulation results (with the utili-
zation of batteries) and the results of corresponding policy scenarios
that do not apply batteries (for a detailed description and analysis of the
scenarios without batteries, see [2]. With regards to securing a stable
electricity supply, those policy scenarios that include use of batteries
show similar results to the corresponding ones without batteries. In the
reference scenario, the electricity supply is insufficient for the demand.
The alternative policy scenarios are capable of guaranteeing the se-
curity of the supply. Concerning the expansion of RE, policy scenarios
with and without batteries also show relatively similar results.
Fig. A1. Reference scenario, installed capacity for conventional power plants and RE.
Fig. A2. Standard policy scenario – batteries subsidized, installed capacity for conventional power plants, RE and batteries.
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However, in these scenarios where RE remains on the free market, the
application of batteries results in a lower expansion of RE. This is be-
cause the utilization of batteries reduces peak load prices (see Section
3.2.1), so that investments become less attractive to private investors.
The comparison of CO2 emissions makes clear that the application of
batteries leads to reduced emissions. More specifically, the simulations
show that this is because batteries store excess RE supply and discharge
it during times of high demand, so that less conventional power plants
are required. Fig. 6 compares the subsidies and external costs of the
developed policy scenarios with the corresponding costs of those sce-
narios that do not adopt the use of batteries. The results clearly de-
monstrate that, with the exception of the ‘regulated RE adaptation
policy scenario’ and the ‘free market RE adaptation policy scenario’, all
policy scenarios that adopt batteries result in both lower external costs
and lower subsidies. The total costs of the ‘free market green policy
scenario’, which has the lowest total costs among those policy scenarios
including batteries, are around € 26 billion (36%) below the costs of the
comparable scenario without batteries.
Regarding the decrease in CO2 emissions, the significant reduction
in external costs compared to the comparable scenarios without bat-
teries can be explained by the replacement of conventional power
plants by battery storage of excess RE. Batteries are able to store excess
electricity that is produced in times of low demand, particularly during
the night. This excess electricity comprises to a large extent of wind
energy, which has very low external costs. Furthermore, batteries can
release electricity during the hours of high demand. As a result, the
need for flexibly available power plants, which are typically CO2 in-
tensive conventional power plants, is reduced. For the same reasons,
government subsidies also decrease here in comparison to policy sce-
narios that do not apply batteries. The charging of batteries in times of
low demand leads to a higher utilization of power plants, which, in
turn, improves their profitability, so that less subsidies need to be spent.
The discharging of batteries when demand is high reduces the need for
peak load power plants, which are often highly dependent on subsidies
due to low operating hours and small contribution margins stemming
from their high marginal costs.
In conclusion, then, many of our simulations are in line with the
findings in the existing academic literature. Our simulations indicate
Fig. A3. Free market green policy scenario – batteries subsidized, installed capacity for conventional power plants, RE and batteries.
Fig. A4. Green support policy scenario – batteries subsidized, installed capacity for conventional power plants, RE and batteries.
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that batteries could be very suitable as a supplementation to the fluc-
tuating supply of RE, due to their ability to store excess RE supply and
discharge it during times of high demand. Furthermore, similar to
earlier results in the literature (e. g. [12], our findings indicate that the
utilization of batteries reduces the amount of conventional power
plants and hence leads to a decrease in CO2 emissions. Our simulations
also show that free market-based investments in batteries are not
competitive compared to RE or conventional energy technologies (si-
milar to the findings of e. g. [28]. Finally, our simulations indicate that
for most of the policy scenarios we developed, the required amount of
government subsidies is considerably lower as compared to required
subsidies in corresponding policy scenarios that do not apply batteries.
Consequently, governments should consider the application of batteries
as an important technology for achieving ongoing RE expansion and
security over the electricity supply.
4.3.7. Sensitivity analysis
We carried out a sensitivity analysis to identify changes in the de-
mand for electricity, as well as changes to the costs of batteries
(detailed results are available from the authors upon request). Our re-
sults show that modest variations in electricity demand (± 0.50%/
year) do not have a significant effect on our key findings pertaining to
energy security, RE expansion and the amount of installed battery ca-
pacity. Within a free market environment, a 10 percent reduction in the
cost of batteries does not lead to increased battery investment. In the
other proposed policy scenarios, a decrease in the costs of batteries
leads to a reduction of subsidies that provide necessary compensation
for years of unprofitable battery operations (not applicable for the
standard policy scenario and green FIT policy scenario, which do not
require any battery subsidization at all).
5. Conclusions
As a result of the ongoing expansion of renewable energy with low
marginal costs, electricity prices have decreased. Consequently, many
renewable energy and conventional power plants are no longer able to
operate profitably and ultimately shut down. Based on empirical data,
our research shows that, under free market conditions, this results in an
Fig. A5. Green FIT policy scenario – batteries subsidized, installed capacity for conventional power plants, RE and batteries.
Fig. A6. Regulated RE adaptation policy scenario – batteries subsidized, installed capacity for conventional power plants, RE and batteries.
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insufficient electricity supply to meet demand. In this context, we
analyzed the impact of batteries on renewable energy expansion and
the security of the electricity supply. Despite substantial cost reductions
in batteries due to technological innovation in recent years, our re-
ference policy scenario shows that, in a free market environment, bat-
tery investment is not profitable for private investors. On the other
hand, through developing six policy scenarios we showed that by
subsidizing investments in batteries governments could ensure a secure
electricity supply as well as ongoing renewable energy expansion.
Comparisons to comparable policy scenarios that do not adopt batteries
indicated that the total sum of government subsidies and external costs
was up to 36% lower as a consequence of utilizing batteries. Our ana-
lysis showed that batteries are capable of storing excess electricity
production, particularly from renewable energy, resulting in a higher
utilization of power plants and the replacement of high CO2-emitting
conventional power plants. Policymakers should be aware that the
merit order effect of renewable energies (which leads to reduced elec-
tricity prices) is a significant risk with respect to securing the electricity
supply and achieving renewable energy expansion, and, as such, re-
quires some form of governmental intervention. Our analysis under-
scores that batteries are a very useful technology through which to si-
multaneously guarantee ongoing renewable energy expansion and an
uninterrupted electricity supply. Furthermore, we underlined that pol-
icymakers should always take into consideration the external costs of
energy generation when deciding on sustainable policy scenarios.
In general, our results for the German market could be relevant for
other countries that aim to increase renewable energy production.
Independent of the policy scenario that a country chooses for renewable
energy, increasing amounts of renewable energy production will always
lead to the challenge of securing a stable electricity supply under
fluctuating renewable energy levels. Government subsidies for batteries
might be an economically efficient policy scenario for countries to si-
multaneously guarantee ongoing renewable energy expansion and an
uninterrupted electricity supply. Developing economies that often have
a huge potential for renewable energy expansion, but at the same time
often lack technological expertise and capital to invest in renewable
energy technologies, could also apply the recommended subsidization
mechanism. The subsidization could be funded by a surcharge on all
electricity consumers of the particular economy with electricity-in-
tensive manufacturers being (almost) excluded in order to maintain
their international competitiveness. This would allow for profitable
investment conditions and consequently international investors and
manufacturers could be attracted to invest and transfer their state-of-
the art technologies in the developing economies. In order to minimize
the surcharge that has to be paid by electricity consumers, governments
could additionally grant tax reductions to renewable energy or battery
companies. Foreign aid could further facilitate the transition to sus-
tainable energies in developing economies.
Lastly, it is important to acknowledge and reflect on the limitations
of our methodological approach; these largely relate to the assumptions
adopted for the simulation analysis. In our electricity market model, we
utilized average availability factors for renewable energy. This as-
sumption does not allow to investigate the impact of actual fluctuations
of renewable energy in detail. Future research could expand our ana-
lytical framework with hourly simulations of renewable energy avail-
abilities. This would give a more detailed overview of the economic
impacts of both actual excess demand and excess supply in times of very
low and very high renewable energy production respectively.
Furthermore, our analysis was confined to a limited number of eco-
nomic and environmental indicators. Future research should broaden
the focus and discuss impacts on additional (macro)economic variables
(e.g. financial indicators, effects on employment, etcetera) as well as
additional environmental indicators (e.g. SO2, PM, NOx, toxic and
hazardous materials of batteries, resource use, water use and land re-
clamation). Moreover, we did not consider the possibility of an in-
creasing utilization of additional storage options, such as electric ve-
hicles and power-to-gas. As these technologies increasingly lead to a
rise in electricity demand and serve as storage capacities, it would be an
interesting extension of our research to include such options. Finally,
future research could expand upon our analytical framework by in-
cluding the effects of cross-border electricity trade and exploring new
remuneration mechanisms for renewable energy.
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